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Abstract 
Title of Dissertation: A qualitative study of the Interaction between 
Maritime Pilots and Vessel Traffic Service 
Operators
Degree: MSc
The aim of this dissertation is to seek knowledge into the area of interaction between 
pilots  and  VTSOs.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  there  is  evidence  in  the  form of 
statements  by industry people,  accident  reports  and  investigations  indicating  that 
there are issues within the interaction that can affect  the performance of the two 
safety systems in a negative way, and thus resulting in adversed effects on safety at 
sea.
During this work a qualitative research in the form of interviews were performed in 
order to gain knowledge of this subject. The respondents were VTSOs and pilots in 
the Sound. The main findings of this indicates that there are social issues that affect 
the interaction between pilots and VTSOs. These social issues reveal themselves in 
the  form  of  a  strong  feeling  of  group  belonging,  lack  of  trust  and  lack  of 
communication.  In  order  to  enhance  the  co-operation  between the  pilots  and  the 
VTSOs, these social issues have to be addressed and properly dealt with. One way to 
achieve this could be to train pilots and VTSOs together or to find other effective 
means of interaction e.g. common meetings on a regular basis, as this will provide a 
better  understanding  of  how  the  other  service  functions  and  it  will  also  be  an 
excellent chance to get to know each other and thereby building up the trust
KEYWORDS: maritime, pilotage, VTS, co-operation
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 1 Introduction
1.1. Safety at sea
To  raise  or  maintain  the  level  of  safety  in  a  particular  sea-area,  a  State  or  an 
organisation has the option of implementing different kinds of safety systems. Some 
of  them  can  be  viewed  as  being  passive  (Hughes,  2009,  p.  440) e.g.  Traffic 
Separation Schemes (TSS); others can be denoted as active e.g. pilotage or Vessel 
Traffic Services (VTS). It is up to the organisation to decide which system/systems to 
implement in order to achieve the desired safety level. In areas that are deemed to 
need  a  high  safety  level,  multiple  safety  systems  can  be  implemented,  and  a 
combination of the three earlier mentioned is a common choice. This will result in 
the fact that different safety systems are active in the same area and with the same 
overall  goal;  moreover,  these  systems  will  interact  and  affect  each  other.  The 
interaction between the passive system and the two active ones  are  rather  static; 
however, the interaction between the two active ones are dynamic and should be so 
in order to achieve the best  result.  This dissertation will  focus on the two active 
systems – VTS and pilotage. 
Pilotage has a long history of acting as a safety system in areas deemed to propose 
difficulties for the navigator of a ship. Typical such areas could be - ports, rivers, 
heavily trafficked areas, areas with potential adversed meteorological / hydrological 
conditions and/or areas with a highly sensitive environment. VTS, on the other hand, 
is  a  relative  new  type  of  safety  system  compared  to  pilotage,  and  is  often 
implemented in areas already covered by pilot services. The goal for the two services 
is to assist ships in their voyage from one geographical position to another in the 
safest and most efficient way possible. VTS does this by monitoring the ships in the 
assigned sea area, trying to organize the traffic in the safest and most efficient way. 
At the same time the pilot is active in that same area on one of the VTS monitored 
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ships. In theory, this would warrant a high level of safety in all situations by having 
two independent systems assisting the ship on its voyage. Although the systems are 
independent,  the  nature  of  work  demands  that  the  two  systems  interact  and  co-
operate to achieve the best result. This interaction is according to the author an area 
that needs to be investigated since there has surfaced evidence that points on the fact 
that there can arise issues from the interaction that can have negative effect on safety 
at sea. 
 2 Background
The issue of safety at sea is an issue that has got more and more attention recently 
due to the rising concern for the environment by the public. Authorities have to take 
measures to confine the risk of having an accident that might cause damage to the 
environment.  Two  of  the  measures  that  authorities  can  choose  to  implement  is 
pilotage and VTS. These two safety systems are often combined and do often operate 
in  the  same  area  and  on  the  same  object  i.e.  the  ship;  moreover,  they  do  it 
simultaneously. The fact of having these two systems acting in the same area might, 
under certain circumstances, affect each other in a negative way - resulting in that the 
desired safety level is not met, this fact is similar to what Perrow describes he's book 
Normal Accidents (Perrow, 1999). This issue was first noted by the author during his 
work as a VTS operator, employed by the Swedish Maritime Administration. At first 
this  was perceived as a  minor  problem by the author  and believed to be a  local 
occurrence. Nevertheless, the issue was raised during discussions with people in the 
business,  both  pilots  and  VTSOs  and  it  was  found  that  issues  rising  from  the 
interaction between pilots and VTS was not a local issue, but rather an issue that was 
identified by others working in different regions and countries. Further on, this was 
backed up by accident reports  that,  although not always in a direct  way, showed 
irregularities in the interaction between pilots and VTS. Moreover, the issue of co-
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operation between pilots  and VTS has been raised at  two consecutive congresses 
organized  by  the  International  Maritime  Pilots  Association  (IMPA).  During  the 
XVIth  congress  held  in  Hamburg  2002 the  IMO Secretary-General  W.A.  O'Neil 
brought forward the question of how the relationship between pilots and shore-based 
vessel traffic operators would develop in the future; moreover, he identifies the need 
to integrate the VTS into the vessel control team  (O'Niel, 2002). In the following 
congress  held  in  Istanbul  2004,  the  now  acting  Secretary-General  Efthimios 
Mitropoulos continues on the subject of VTS and pilot co-operation, and states that 
in his view the two services are two complementary services; however, Mitropoulus 
does recognise that there are opinions among the pilot community that see the VTS 
as a threat (Mitropoulos, 2004). To sum up, both the present Secretary-General and 
his  predecessor  do  acknowledge  the  importance  of  the  co-operation  between  the 
growing VTS industry and the pilot service – and they both indicate that a rivalry 
between the two services can be found.   
2.1. Technical description of the two systems
The two safety systems of VTS and pilotage are widely spread around the globe; 
however, it should be noted that the two systems, although governed by international 
guidelines  and  conventions,  vary  from  state  to  state.  Hereunder,  a  technical 
description, which is based on international conventions and guidelines governing 
pilotage and VTS, will be presented of the two systems. The aim of this description 
is to give the reader a brief  knowledge of the two systems of pilotage and VTS, 
which is needed to understand further discussions and analysis in this dissertation. 
2.2. Pilotage
 2.2.1 History of pilot services
Pilotage has a very long history, and the exact origin of pilots are most probably lost 
in the same. The notion of pilot is found in the bible in the book of Ezekiel where the 
word pilot is used four times, moreover, Homer (Homerus) writes about Thestor the 
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pilot in the first book of Iiiad  (Hofstee, 2003). Since the early days of navigation, 
ships navigating in or out of ports, or in other areas deemed to propose difficulties in 
navigation, has been guided by pilots. These pilots adviced the master of how to 
conduct the ship - based on their local knowledge and experience ((U.S.) & Piloting, 
1994, p. 30). By doing so pilots have since the beginning of shipping contributed to 
safety and efficiency of ship traffic. In Sweden, there are traces found that indicate 
that during the 1400th century local inhabitants of the archipelago and sailors did 
perform  pilot  services  against  payment;  however,  a  more  un-organized  form  of 
pilotage is believed to have existed long before this (Hillberg, 2007).   
 2.2.2 Pilotage of today
As described in previous paragraphs pilotage has a long history, today most coastal 
States has laws and regulations that cover the area of pilotage. A pilot of today is still 
an adviser to the ship's master and he still possesses a great deal of local knowledge. 
According to  International  Maritime Pilots  Association (IMPA) and the European 
Maritime Pilots Association (EMPA) the prime obligation for a pilot is:
Assist  the  master  of  a  ship,  by  providing  local  knowledge  of  navigational  and 
operational  matters  combined  with  specialist  ship-handling  experience.  The  pilot 
should also be familiar with the local requirements and unique conditions that prevail 
in the area. The pilot serves the public by contributing to the overall safety at sea and 
thereby the protection of the environment; moreover, the pilot is to contribute to the 
free flow of ship traffic in  the area  (“EMPA main,”  2009; “IMPA - International 
Maritime  Pilots'  Association,”  2009).  Pilotage  can  be  divided  into  different 
categories namely, port-pilotage and deep sea pilotage. In port pilotage, the pilot is 
onboard for the transit to or from the port, which usually is a shorter period of time, 
typically a few hours; in the event of deep sea pilotage, the pilot could be onboard a 
ship for a much more extended time that could span over several days. 
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 2.2.3 Conventions and guidelines governing pilotage
The importance of pilot services was formally recognized by IMO in 1968, when the 
organization adopted resolution A.159(ES.IV). The resolution recommends States to 
organize pilotage services in areas where such service is likely to be more effective 
than other measures. Further, in 1981 IMO adopted resolution A.485(XII), that was 
reviewed  and  replaced  by  Resolution  A 960,  Recommendation  on  training  and 
certification and on operational procedures for maritime pilots other than deep sea 
pilots. This  resolution  was  adopted  in  2003  and  is  in  force  today.  These  two 
resolutions can be seen as the most important ones. IMO has moreover, produced a 
number  of  documents  regarding  technical  issues  with  respect  to  pilotage  e.g.  in 
SOLAS Chapter V there are requirements on how to embark or disembark pilots in a 
safe way. IMPA has a consultant status at IMO, and takes an active role in updating 
and  drafting  new/existing  guidelines  and  conventions.  Another  organisation  that 
produces guidelines regarding pilotage is EMPA. 
2.3. Vessel Traffic Services
 2.3.1 Development of VTS 
Not  long  after  World  War  II,  it  was  clear  that  short  range  audio-visual  aid  to 
navigation was not sufficient enough to assist ships in their voyage into or from a 
port in all weather conditions. This resulted in delays that propagated to other modes 
of transport and affected the import export industries of a State. There was a need to 
be able  to  keep ports  open in  all  conditions  of  visibility and traffic  density.  The 
maritime experts of the time believed that the use of shore-based radar combined 
with communications to monitor and organize the traffic could be applied to enhance 
the safety and thereby the efficiency in port areas. The first shore-based radar was 
implemented  in  Douglas,  Isle  of  Man  in  1948  and  was  followed  by  stations  in 
Liverpool and Rotterdam. These single radar stations were developed, and in 1956 
the entire port of Rotterdam was covered by a chin of shore-based radars. The main 
objective  of  these  systems  was to  keep  the  traffic  operating  without  any delays; 
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however, the issue of safety was also considered, and there were studies conducted 
on this topic. The conclusion was that these simple radar systems not only enhanced 
the efficiency of the traffic flow - but they also reduced the numbers of accidents in 
the area. During the nineteen-sixties and seventies there was a rising concern among 
the public with regards to the maritime environment; this concern came from some 
major  shipping  accidents  e.g.  Torrey  Canyon  and  Amoco  Cadiz.  The  authority's 
answer, was to expand and further develop the use of radar surveillance and vessel 
traffic management (IALA Vessel Traffic Services Manual, 2008, p. 14).
 2.3.2 VTS of today
As technology was developing, the shore-based radar systems evolved from being a 
quite  simple  system  consisting  of  radar  and  communication  with  the  aim  of 
increasing  efficiency  of  shipping  in  adversed  weather  conditions,  to  a  highly 
advanced system with  multiple  sensors  with  the  aim of  increasing  safety at  sea, 
improving the efficiency of maritime traffic and to protect the environment. Today 
there  are  some 500 VTS systems  in  use all  over  the  globe  and the number  will 
continue to grow as many coastal states wishes to be protected from any negative 
effects of maritime traffic (“Feature: VTS comes of age with increasingly strategic 
role - BIMCO,” 2008). According to Resolution A 857(20) produced by IMO, there 
are two different kinds of VTS, one is the Port or Harbour VTS and the other one is a 
Coastal VTS. The Port VTS is mainly concerned with ship traffic to or from a port, 
while a Coastal VTS is mainly concerned with ship traffic passing through the VTS 
area. In a VTS area there are different service levels that the VTS can provide the 
ship traffic with, these are:
Information Service (INS).  An Information Service provides essential and 
timely  information  to  assist  the  on-board  decision-making  process.   An 
Information Service does not participate in on-board decision-making; 
Traffic Organisation Service (TOS).  A Traffic Organisation Service is a 
service  to  provide  for  the  safe  and  efficient  movement  of  traffic  and  to 
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identify  and  manage  potentially  dangerous  traffic  situations.   A  Traffic 
Organisation Service provides essential  and timely information to assist the 
on-board decision-making process and may advise, instruct or exercise the 
authority to direct movements; 
Navigational Assistance Service (NAS).  A Navigational Assistance Service 
may  be  provided  in  addition  to  an  Information  Service  and/or  Traffic 
Organisation Service.  It  is a service to assist in the on-board navigational 
decision-making process and is provided at the request of a vessel, or when 
deemed necessary by the VTS. A Navigational Assistance Service provides 
essential and timely navigational information to assist the on-board decision-
making process and may inform, advise and/or instruct vessels accordingly. 
(IALA Vessel Traffic Services Manual, 2008, p. 63)
The development of VTS are still  very much ongoing and at the time of writing, 
there are processes that aim to develop a concept called Vessel Traffic Management 
(VTM) which is an enhanced VTS service that aims to incorporate more services into 
the VTS systems. Such services could be maritime security, law enforcement, and 
search and rescue (SAR).   
 2.3.3 Conventions and guidelines governing VTS
During the development of VTS, there was a need for international harmonisation 
and  the  issue  was  brought  forward  to  Inter-Governmental  Maritime  Consultative 
Organisation  (IMCO),  the  predecessor  of  International  Maritime  Organisation 
(IMO).  A  resolution,  A.587(14)  was  produced  and  adopted  encompassing  the 
implementation  and  it  provided  the  framework  for  further  harmonisation.  The 
requirements brought forward in the resolution were considered by the International 
Association  of  Marine  Aids  to  Navigation  and  Lighthouse  Authorities  (IALA) 
together  with  the  International  Maritime  Pilots  Association  (IMPA)  and  the 
International Association of Ports and Harbours (IAPH). During the mid-1990's the 
resolution  was  updated  and  a  new resolution  was  adopted,  A.857(20).  This  new 
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resolution is internationally recognized to be the source policy document of VTS. 
IALA  has  become  the  organisation  that  deals  with  VTS  issues  and  holds  a 
consultative status at IMO. VTS are also governed by other conventions, in IALA's 
VTS  manual  the  conventions  that  have  relevance  to  VTS  are  listed  (Table  1). 
Moreover, IALA has produced several documents that are relevant to VTS and they 
are compiled in a publication called IALA VTS Manual. The content of the manual 
spans over technical issues to issues regarding the training and certification of VTS 
personnel. 
Table 1: IMO Conventions that have relevance to VTS
Source: (IALA Vessel Traffic Services Manual, 2008, p. 31)
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2.4. The evidence that builds the case
When trying to validate this research, several sources of information have been used; 
however, it has proven difficult to find sources that can be used as “hard” evidence. 
During the research it has not been possible to find any recent academic writings 
regarding the specific issue of interaction between pilots and VTS; however, there 
are  other  documents  and  reports  that  touch  upon  the  subject.  These  sources  of 
information can, when scrutinized from the pilot – VTS interaction point of view, 
provide information that helps to underpin this research.  
 2.4.1 Customer research ordered by SMA 
During 2008 the Swedish Maritime Administration ordered an investigation to be 
made regarding the customer's view on the services rendered by the administration. 
The investigation was conducted by Statistiska Centralbyrån, Statistics Sweden, and 
the target group was ships agents, ships officers and pilots. It should be noted that 
pilots are employed by SMA and are therefore not a customer; however, they are 
using all the services that were to be investigated. The services that were dealt with 
in  this  investigation  were  Fairways,  VTS and Sea  charts.  The  main  results  were 
presented in the form of a grade index that ranges from 0-100. A grade index below 
40 can be classed as not satisfactory; the limit for satisfactory are at 55 and a grade 
index of more than 75 can be viewed as very satisfactory. 
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Source: (SCB Pilots Survey, 2009, p. 5)
The overall result of the part where pilots got to evaluate VTS was 39, which can be 
seen as not satisfactory. The result is presented in Figure 1.In the model analysis 
made the factors regarding Information and Performance are deemed to be prioritized 
to improve the service  (SCB Pilots  Survey,  2009). The pilot's assessment of VTS 
clearly shows that they are not satisfied with the function of VTS services in Sweden. 
This could be seen as evidence that VTS services in Sweden are not performing in a 
satisfactory way. However, the results from the survey where ships officers evaluated 
VTS are quite different. In the results of that survey VTS got an overall index of 74, 
which according to the index is satisfactory and it is very close to be classified as 
very satisfactory (75) (SCB Ships Officer Survey, 2009) . The results are presented in 
Figure 2.
19
Overall index        Availability            Treatment            Information          Performance
Figure 1: Pilots overall index 
Source: (SCB Ships Officer Survey, 2009, p. 3)
In the model analysis, the factor regarding Information is deemed to be prioritized to 
improve the service. In conclusion, the results suggest that the VTS service is not 
satisfactory according to the pilots, while the ships officers give the VTS a rather 
high overall index. 
 2.4.2 Accident reports
There are few accident reports that  investigate the relationship between VTS and 
pilots as a contributory factor to the development of an accident. During the literature 
research  contact  was  made with  accident  investigation  organisations,  such  as  the 
Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate’s Marine Casualty Investigation Division and 
the  organisation  responsible  in  United  Kingdom,  Marine  Accident  Investigation 
Branch (MAIB) asking for help to find relevant accident reports. The result of that 
request was not very fruitful, as it seems that the area of interaction between VTS 
and pilots is an area that often just  is described and not analysed in the accident 
investigation. The reason for this might be that the accident investigation used do not 
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Overall index        Availability            Treatment            Information          Performance
Figure 2: Ships officers overall index 
extend into organisational issues. 
The collision between Audacity and Leonis
One of the few accidents found during the literature review for this dissertation that 
points  out  the  area  of  interaction  between  pilots  and  VTS,  is  the  report  of  the 
collision of the Audacity, a product tanker loaded with gas oil,  and the Leonis, a 
general cargo ship. The accident occurred in 2007 in the approaches to river Humber 
in the United Kingdom. At the time of the accident there was poor visibility in the 
area and both ships had pilots onboard. Luckily, there was only structural damage as 
a result, but it is easy to imagine the potential negative impact on the environment if 
the gas oil carried by the Audacity had escaped into the environment. In the analysis 
made by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) critic was issued against 
the Humber VTS for being passive. In the conclusion of the report it is stated that:
VTS operators did not consider they were able to give advice and guidance to 
vessels  with pilots  on board.  It  was considered that the pilot  would know 
what he was doing and that the operator did not need to be further involved 
once a pilot was on board (MAIB, 2008, p. 36).
This indicates that the VTSO was reluctant to assist a ship with a pilot onboard, 
although the operating procedures of Humber VTS stated the following:
Thus, if he observes that a vessel is navigating unsafely and is, for example, 
about to run aground or perhaps to collide with another vessel then he has a 
duty to do everything in his power to prevent a mishap taking place.  In doing 
so, however, he should avoid giving direct pilotage advice if at all possible. 
(MAIB, 2008, sec. Annex 8)
Moreover,  IMO  Resolution  A.857(20),  clearly  states  in  paragraph  2.3.4,  that 
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instructions are to be given to the master or the pilot. 
The allision between Cosco Busan and the San Francisco–Oakland 
Bay Bridge 
The allision between Cosco Busan and the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge is 
another accident where the accident investigation reflects up on the involvement of 
both  pilot  and  the  VTS.  The  investigation  was  carried  out  by  the  National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). 
On the 7 November, 2007, Cosco Busan was outbound from the Port of Oakland 
with  a  pilot  onboard.  The  Cosco  Busan  was  intended  to  transit  under  the  San 
Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge between the delta-echo span; however, Cosco Busan 
made a navigational error which resulted in contact with one of the bridge pylons. 
The contact resulted in a long and wide gash in the hull, allowing fuel oil to escape 
into the sea. Prior to the allision, the VTSO on duty noticed that the Cosco Busan 
was deviating from its intended route, and approximately three minutes before the 
allision took place the VTS radioed the pilot on the VHF, and asked him for his 
intentions. NTSB concludes in their accident report that the probable cause of the 
accident was due to;
the failure to safely navigate the vessel in restricted visibility as a result of (1) 
the  pilot’s  degraded  cognitive  performance  from  his  use  of  impairing 
prescription medications, (2) the absence of a comprehensive pre-departure 
master/pilot  exchange and a  lack  of  effective communication between the 
pilot  and  the  master  during  the  accident  voyage,  and  (3)  the  master’s 
ineffective  oversight  of  the  pilot’s  performance  and  the  vessel’s  progress 
(NTSB, 2009, p. Xi) .
Although the report in its conclusion of the probably cause does not involve the VTS 
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as a contributory factor, the report identifies and evaluates the actions taken by the 
VTS. In the conclusion under the findings section it is stated in bullet point number 
13 and 15 that: 
13. Vessel Traffic Service San Francisco personnel, in the minutes before the 
allision, provided the pilot with incorrect navigational information that may 
have confused him about the vessel’s heading.
15.  Although  Vessel  Traffic  Service  San Francisco  personnel  should  have 
provided the pilot and the master with unambiguous information about the 
vessel’s proximity to the Delta tower, the Safety Board could not determine 
whether such information, had it been provided, would have prevented the 
allision (NTSB, 2009, p. 134).
The pilot onboard the Cosco Busan has a different view, in the submission made by 
the pilot, commenting on NTSB draft report it is stated that a correct warning even if 
it is communicated in a late stage would have made a big difference. According to 
the pilot, he would have had time to alter the course and pass the bridge in a safe way 
(Bornstein & Quiroz, 2008, p. 19). The fact that the VTS did not perform as intended 
and that it communicated the wrong information lead to the situation that one of the 
board members voted against the results of the investigation. The reason stated for 
voting against the report was mainly due to the fact that the VTS, even though they 
where closely monitoring the ship, did intervene in an earlier stage. 
If one scrutinizes the accident from a pilot - VTS point of view, one might propose 
the following questions:
• The VTS did monitor the ship's transit and they were aware of the intended 
route, still there was no communication with the ship until 3 minutes before 
the allison. Why did the VTS not intervene at an earlier stage? Was it because 
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there was a pilot onboard?
• Why did the pilot not utilize the VTS as an aid when he discovered that the 
radar was not working properly, and he was in doubt of the position of the 
ship?
 3 Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is threefold, firstly it will illuminate and analyse the 
interaction of pilots and vessel traffic operators. Secondly, it will try to identify the 
origin of the found issues, and thirdly, it will propose some recommendations on how 
the interaction might be improved to gain safer seas. 
There are two key questions that this dissertation aims to answer, those are;
− How do pilots and VTSO perceive the co-operation between them?
− Are there issues related to the interaction between VTS and pilots that could 
affect safety at sea? 
 4 Method
The issues relating to the interaction between VTSO and pilots was identified by the 
author through the experiences of working on daily bases with the two groups. These 
issues were deemed important to understand to be able to improve both services, and 
thereby contribute to a safer sea. Further, it is the believed by the author that the main 
area to address in this issue lies within the area of social science and more precise in 
the interpersonal interaction between the two service providers i.e. pilots and VTSO. 
When consulting different research methods, the method of Case Study was found to 
be the most appropriate one to use in the quest of gaining knowledge of this subject.
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4.1. Description of the Case study Method
The main  cause  for  choosing Case  Study as  method is  that  it  can,  according  to 
Merriam,  help the researcher gain in depth understanding of a certain situation and 
how the people involved perceive that  same situation.  Moreover,  it  is  suitable to 
tackle  problems that  need  to  be understood before one can  improve the practice 
(Merriam, 1988). This view is also shared by Patton who claims that Case Study is 
useful  when one wants  to  understand a  problem in great  depth  and when a  few 
samples can be used to learn a great deal (Patton, 1987, p. 19). Merriam concludes 
after comparing five author's definitions of case study that the fundamental features 
of a case study are – particularistic, descriptive, heuristic and inductive  (Merriam, 
1988, p. 26). 
4.2. Literature review
The  literature  used  was  drawn from various  sources,  such  as  books,  conference 
proceedings,  seminars,  research  reports,  accident  reports,  peer  reviewed  journals, 
periodicals,  class handouts,  data bases,  incident reports  from Sound VTS and the 
internet.  The  literature  review  has  been  done  in  two  phases.  Firstly  a  scooping 
literature review was made to investigate if there were earlier academic writings on 
the subject. The result of that search was that no previous academic papers or other 
document was found. Secondly, a search of other relevant information sources that 
could be used was performed; this search included contact with international key 
persons in the specific area of VTS and pilotage asking them for assistance in the 
search.  Although  there  were  no  previous  academic  writings  found,  there  are 
areas/subjects that are closely related to this subject. One such area is the issue of 
Shore Based Piloting (SBP), which is currently under discussion in many European 
countries; therefore, literature on that subject was used as a source of information. 
The aim has been to acquire a wide range of literature and to use the most recently 
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and up to date information. 
4.3. Interviews
The  aim  of  the  interviews  was  to  gain  understanding  of  how  the  respondents 
perceived  the  interaction  between  pilots  and  VTSOs.  According  to  Patel  and 
Davidsson, the use of a qualitative interview method is most appropriate to obtain 
such understanding  (Patel & Davidsson, 2003, p. 78). There are different forms of 
qualitative interviews that could be applied; these forms ranges from an open form to 
a structured form. To be able to gather specific information from all respondents a 
semi-structured interview was applied. These interviews are controlled by a number 
of questions that are open-ended. The semi-structured interviews are based on the 
individual  respondents  defining  their  reality  in  different  ways.  The  aim  of  the 
interview is thus not to force the respondents to adopt the researcher's categorisation 
of the world  (Patton, 1980 as cited in Merriam, 1988, p. 88). The questions were 
drafted  by  the  author  based  on  pre-knowledge  and  information  obtained  during 
literature review of the subject. In the process of interviewing for this research notes 
were taken during the interviews, and they were recorded with a dictaphone. When 
interviews are used to gather the data the conclusions will be, to some degree, built 
up  on  self-reported  data  –  the  respondents  make  a  conscious  choice  of  what  to 
answer and what not to answer  (Lantz, 1993, p. 15).  Moreover, when transcribing 
interviews, there is a risk that information is since the spoken words and the written 
words are not really the same; there are nuances in the spoken language that can be 
lost when it is transcribed in written words (Patel & Davidsson, 2003, p. 104).  This 
is the nature of interviewing; however, care has been taken to limit the effect of the 
latter. To validate the interviews and to make the questions as objective as possible, a 
modified Delphi method was used when constructing the questions.  
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 4.3.1 Delphi Method 
The Delphi concept was developed in the early 1950s under a U.S. Air Force study 
headed by the Rand Corporation. The scope of the study was how to use the opinions 
of  experts.  Out  of  this  study the  Delphi  method was developed and is  currently 
widely used. There are several forms of the Delphi method existing today; one of 
them can be denoted as the conventional Delphi. This conventional Delphi method is 
a paper-and-pencil exercise and can in short be summarized as follows:
A  team  develops  a  questionnaire  which  is  sent  to  a  bigger  group  called  the 
respondent group, when the questionnaire is returned, it is evaluated by the team and 
a new questionnaire is produced and sent out including the feedback made by the 
respondent group. The respondents group are usually given at least one opportunity 
to re-evaluate their original answers that have been evaluated by the team. 
This  will  according  to  Linstine  and  Turoff  facilitate  a  structured  group 
communication process that allows a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a 
complex issue (Linstone & Turoff, 1975, p. 3). 
The use of the Delphi method when developing the questions for the data collection 
was done to limit the influence of the author and to produce questions that are the 
result of a group of experts in the field, thereby providing validity to the interviews.
The Delphi method used for this dissertation is modified to fit the specific purpose 
better.  The  author  has  drafted  the  questions  based  upon  the  initial  research 
performed, and then sent them out to a group of experts chosen by the author. The 
expert group has then made their comments and sent the questions back to the author, 
and the comments have been considered when drafting the final interview questions. 
The members of the expert group consisted of the following persons:
– Martina Bach, CEO, Inquiring Relations
– Anders Alestam, Area Manager of South Coast Maritime Traffic Area
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– Jens-Uwe Schröder, Associate Professor at World Maritime University
– Michael Manuel, Phd canditate 
– Per Baek Hansen, Danish VTS Manager
Great care should be taken when construction questions according to de Vaus, in his 
book  Surveys in Social Research, it is suggested that 6 broad principles should be 
observed  when  designing  questions.  These  6  principels  are:  reliability,  validity, 
discrimination, response rate, same meaning for all respondents and relevance. These 
principles have been considered when finalizing the questions; moreover, de Vaus 
proposes a check list to be used when wording the questions which also has been 
followed in the construction of the final  questions  (Vaus, 2002, p. 97). The final 
questions used were:
 1 What is the purpose of your job? 
 2 Describe the purpose for the VTS/pilotage. 
 3 How do you see your job changing in the future due to e.g. technological, 
administrative or other issues? 
 4 What information do you need to receive from VTS/pilot in order to be able 
to do your job?
 5 How helpful is the current information offered to you by VTS/Pilot?
 6 How would you describe the relationship between pilots and VTSO?
 7 Have  you  experienced  difficulties  in  the  co-operation  between  pilots  and 
VTS?
 8 How do you perceive the communication between VTS and Pilots?
 9 What  factors  do  you  think  affects  the  communication  between  pilots  and 
VTS?
 10 In what way do pilots and VTS services complement each other?
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 11  Are you utilizing VTS/pilot as an information source in your job?
 12 In which way would you enhance the co-operation between pilots and VTS?
The questions were asked in the order they are presented above. In addition to the 
questions, the respondents were informed that after the last question, they would be 
able to comment on additional issues that they thought was of importance to this 
study. Before the interviews started, the respondents were informed about the topic 
of the study and they all signed a Volunteer Consent Form, where it was stated how 
the data was going to be used and that the interview was conducted in anonymous 
and confidential way. All the interviews were conducted in a good climate and co-
operative manner, where the author felt that the respondents were responsive in a 
very positive manner; moreover, there was felt to be a genuine understanding of the 
subject  and  the  issues  related  to  the  same.  Moreover,  it  were  perceived  that  the 
VTSOs had a slightly bigger interest in this subject, this is based on that the amount 
of answers that were given and the length of the discussions during the interviews.
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 4.3.2 Method for data collection and analysis
The interviews were conducted between 2009-07-22 to 2009-07-28, and the location 
for the interviews was at the SMA Pilot stations in Malmö and Helsingborg. A total 
of ten interviews were conducted, 5 VTSO and 5 pilots. The total number of pilots 
employed at  Malmö or Helsingborg pilots stations is 16, and the total  number of 
VTSO employed in Sound VTS is 14. The pilots are employed by SMA and their 
working  area  is  mainly  the  Sound.  The  VTSOs  are  employed  by SMA and  the 
Danish Maritime Safety Administration and they all work in Sound VTS.  Both pilots 
and VTSO answered the same 12 questions.  To select the respondents the author 
interviewed the pilot or the VTSO that was working the day of the interview. Since 
the author did not have any pre-knowledge of the duty roaster, this can be seen as a 
form of random selection. 
The collection and analysis in a qualitative case study such as this, is not a linear 
process, because the collection and analysis of information do occur simultaneously 
according to  (Merriam, 1988, p. 133). The interviews conducted generated a vast 
amount of data to be analysed. The chosen method used to analyse was to organize 
the data into themes or categories. This organisation of the data was based on the 
notes  taken during the interviews; the notes were first  transferred from the hand 
written paper into a clean written document on the computer, this were conducted 
directly after the interview, and if there were any questions or unclear notes the audio 
recordings were consulted to clarify any unclear statements. When all the interviews 
were conducted, the process of intensive analysis started. The data was put into case 
narratives (presented in Chapter 5), one for pilots and one for VTSOs. The purpose 
of writing case narratives were twofold. Firstly, it serves the purpose of presenting 
the results from the interviews to the reader; secondly, during the process  of writing 
the Case Narratives regularities and phenomenons that reoccurred were identified. 
This process created 4 themes as presented in Chapter 6. These 4 themes were then 
used as the base for the discussion and analysis.  
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 4.4. Limitation 
The size of this research is limited, it was only Sound VTS and the Swedish pilots in 
the Sound who were subject to the data collection; therefore,  the interviews only 
allow limited conclusions to be drawn. To be able to get a broader perspective of the 
issues the data collection needs to be extended to include other pilot and VTS areas 
in Sweden and preferably in other countries. There are also limitations regarding the 
gathering of data, which were briefly described previously in paragraph 4.3.
 5 Case narratives 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with an understanding of the result 
obtained  from the  interviews  that  were  conducted.  This  follows  the  thoughts  of 
Kvale,  who  states  that  narratives  can  be  used  as  a  method  of  structuring  and 
presenting  the  results  from interviews  (Kvale,  1996,  p.  274).  Moreover,  the case 
narratives serves the purpose of  structuring the data  into themes or  issues which 
were discussed in  Chapter 4.3.2. The case narratives is the product of the answers 
provided during the interviews, out of which 4 different themes have surfaced. These 
themes are:
• Current and future views on VTS and Pilotage 
• Information
• Communication 
• The relationship and co-operation 
Hereunder these 4 themes will be presented in a narrative way and in Chapter 6 they 
will be discussed and analysed. 
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5.1. VTS operators 
 5.1.1 Current and future views on VTS and Pilotage 
Derived from question 1, 2, 3 
The overall impression after interviewing the VTSOs working at Sound VTS is that 
it is a group of people that are highly qualified for their tasks. They all have a master 
mariner exam and all of them have experience as OOW from various ships. Further, 
they deem themselves  to  be amply experienced and trained  to  perform the tasks 
involved in their work. The purpose of their job is to monitor and assist ships in the 
VTS area with the main intention of hindering accidents from occurring and thereby 
increase safety at sea, which in turn will protect the environment. The VTSOs view 
on  pilotage  has  a  lot  in  common  with  the  view  they  have  of  their  own  jobs. 
According to them, the prime reason for a ship to take onboard a pilot is to increase 
safety,  because the pilot  will contribute to this  by advising the master on how to 
conduct the ship based on the knowledge that the pilot has. The pilot is regarded to 
be a highly qualified expert, with vast knowledge of the local area. Moreover, the 
VTSOs are of the opinion that pilotage is a service that is good and that it will raise 
the level of safety for the ship; moreover, pilotage is a service that will be around in 
the foreseeable future. When questioned about their future as VTSOs the answers 
were positive, although it was recognized that the future is in the hands of politicians 
-  but since history has proven that Sound VTS are effective there are  very good 
chances that the decisions will be in favour of the VTS. Moreover, it is thought that 
VTS services are a growing industry all over the world and it is the way of the future. 
The services of Sound VTS will expand with regards to both the size of the area and 
the service level, which is something that is perceived as positive and will change the 
work for the VTSOs. An expansion of the system will require more education and 
better  technological  equipment.  There  seems  to  be  an  overall  positive  attitude 
towards technology, since it is believed that better technology will help the VTSO to 
perform their  tasks  better.  The  fact  that  Sound VTS as  it  is  operated  today is  a 
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voluntary system providing Information Service is something that can be a hinder for 
the VTSOs in their work. There is a feeling that what they do is not for real, because 
ships  can choose not  to  participate  in  the VTS system. They wish to  have more 
power  in  the  form of  navigational  assistance  to  be able  to  fulfil  their  tasks  in  a 
satisfactory and optimized way. Although the VTSOs are exited about the future and 
the increase of the service level, there are concerns that this might have negative 
implications on the relationship with the pilots.  
 5.1.2 Information 
Derived from question 4, 5, 11
Information exchange is the primary interface between VTS and pilots.  According to 
the VTSOs, the information needed from the pilots is the same information that is 
required  from any  other  ship  i.e.  there  is  no  additional  information  needed  just 
because there is a pilot onboard. Information that could be useful for the VTSO from 
pilots or any other ship is information about issues that they cannot perceive on their 
displays,  e.g. information about malfunctioning navigational aids, visibility in the 
area, the technical status of a ship, if a ship is behaving in an unusually manner and 
obstacles in the fairway. This type of information the VTSO can obtain from any ship 
in the area; however, if it is reported from a pilot, the information is regarded as more 
trustworthy.  The  fact  that  the  information  from  a  pilot  is  perceived  as  more 
trustworthy  is  explained  by  the  assumption  that  the  pilot  has  a  feeling  of 
responsibility for the area in which he serves. It is deemed by the VTSO that the need 
of  information  exchange lies  more  in  the  interest  of  the  pilot  rather  than  in  the 
interest of the VTS. 
 5.1.3 Communication 
Derived from question 8, 9
The information is transferred by means of VHF communications between the VTS 
and the pilot. This communication is according to the VTSO very good, it is short, 
professional and precise. This is believed to be the result of both pilots and VTSOs 
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are similar background and culture. To have the same background is a big advantage 
when  communicating,  as  it  creates  a  better  understanding  of  each  other.  It  is 
recognized  that  there  are  certain  factors  that  affect  the  communication  such  as 
stressed  situations  or  when  external  factors  like  e.g.  weather  conditions  are 
challenging.  Another factor affecting the communication is  personal  issues in  the 
form of competitive or rival interest between the two services.
 5.1.4 The relationship and co-operation 
Derived from question 6, 7, 10, 12 
The relationship between pilots and VTSOs is a relationship over distance; it is rare 
that they meet face to face. Although not demanded by the operative procedures of 
Sound VTS, most VTSO's do check if the ship has a pilot onboard because a ship 
with a pilot onboard gives the VTSO a feeling of safety, which makes it possible to 
take away focus from that ship for a bit longer time than a ship without a pilot. It is 
felt by the VTSOs that there is a professional relationship between the two - this 
relationship is based on their common background as sailors and the fact that both 
parties are trained in the local area i.e. the VTS area. The VTSOs have experienced 
some negative issues in relationship that stems from a feeling of being ignored by the 
pilots – there is a feeling of not being accepted by all pilots in the area. Moreover, 
there  is  noted a difference in the relationship and acceptance of the VTS system 
between  the  Swedish  pilots  compared  with  the  Danish  pilots.  It  is  felt  that  the 
Swedish pilots have accepted the VTS but not all their Danish colleagues have. The 
co-operation as it is today is limited to smaller standard issues, such as providing the 
pilots with the current water level and other technical information. It is similar to the 
co-operation  that  exists  with  all  the  vessels  participating  in  the  VTS  system. 
However, it is recognized that there are common areas that could be explored and 
enhanced to  make the  two services  complement  each  other  in  a  better  way,  and 
thereby increasing the level of safety.  According to the VTSOs, the pilots are the 
eyes on the sea, although the equipment in Sound VTS is deemed to fulfil the needs 
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of the tasks to perform, it can never give the real picture of what is happening in the 
area with regards to certain details. It is in such special situations that the pilots can 
be a complement to the VTSO. There is also a sense that the VTSO can be a good 
complement to the pilot since the VTSO has the overall view of the area and that he 
has the history of the area. 
5.2.  Pilots 
 5.2.1 Current and future views on VTS and Pilotage 
Derived from question 1, 2, 3
The overall purpose with pilotage is to sail a ship from one geographical point to 
another in the safest and most efficient way possible, and by doing so preserving the 
environment. The task of a VTS is to monitor the ship traffic and to assist ships with 
information that can be used by the bridge team; such information can be e.g. water 
level, wind speed and direction and ship movements in the area. There seems to be a 
positive attitude towards technology by the pilots because the new technology aids 
the pilots in their tasks and add to the overall safety. However, the pilots do at the 
same time, place most of the trust in their own knowledge, and do acknowledge that 
to much technical aids might take away the focus from the core task. The fact that the 
ships today are equipped with better and newer technology will not affect their job 
since the crews on the ships are not adequately trained to take advantage of the same. 
However, the technological development can propose a change to their work in the 
form of SBP. The notion of SBP is by the pilots perceived as a service that will not 
function in  practice,  at  least  not in  their  operative area of the Sound. There is  a 
feeling of uncertainty of what the future holds; this is due to the fact that there are 
several  ongoing investigations  with  the  aim of  investigating  alternative  forms  of 
pilotage. This alternative forms could for instance be SBP or the privatization of the 
pilotage services in Sweden. Moreover, there are big organizational changes within 
the SMA that most probably will change the future for the pilots. 
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 5.2.2 Information 
Derived from question 4, 5, 11
The need for information from the VTS to the pilot is very limited; in fact the pilots 
already have the information which they get from the same source as the VTS. The 
information flow should be of a dynamic sort, i.e. it is affected by the type and size 
of  the  ship  that  is  being  piloted,  and  of  the  prevailing  meteorological  and 
hydrological circumstances. It is stated that there are certain special circumstances 
when it might be a need for information exchange; those circumstances could e.g. be 
if  there  is  a  grounded  ship  in  the  fairway that  is  affecting  the  pilots  voyage,  a 
hampered ship in the fairway or if there is any inoperative navigational aids. It is also 
stressed  that  the  information  that  is  received  from  the  VTS  has  to  be  correct 
otherwise it is useless. 
 5.2.3 Communication 
Derived from question 8, 9
The  communication  is  limited,  but  when  it  occurs  it  is  short,  positive  and 
professional.  The  fact  that  all  communication  is  performed  in  English  and  the 
Standard Marine Communication Phrases (SMCP) are used is perceived as positive. 
There is a favour amongst the pilots for the concept of silent VTS1. The pilots have 
noted that inter-ship communication most often is performed outside the VTS VHF 
frequencies. The background of the VTSOs is a factor that affects the communication 
in  a positive way,  as  it  gives  a feeling of  having the same language i.e.  a  good 
understanding  of  each  other.  Stress  is  deemed to  be  a  factor  that  can  affect  the 
communication in a negative way for example, the VTS might call when the situation 
onboard is stressed and this increases the level of stress. 
1 This means a VTS system without any mandatory reporting points.
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 5.2.4 The relationship and co-operation 
Derived from question 6, 7, 10, 12
The relationship between pilots  and VTSOs is  regarded as being OK, but it  is  a 
vague relationship. There are some pilots that recognize that a few pilots other than 
themselves have difficulties in the relationship with the VTS. The co-operation is 
regarded as OK; however, there is very little co-operation between VTS and pilots. 
One  negative  issue  that  affects  the  co-operation  is  all  the  standard  reporting 
therefore, if a Silent VTS were implemented, this negative issue would disappear and 
this would favour co-operation. The fact that VTS has the overall view of the area 
and that the pilot is physically present on the ship is deemed to be a circumstance 
that makes the two services complementary to each other. Both parties are perceived 
to be service organisations with the intention to serve maritime traffic.  There are 
suggestions that there might be a difference in the hierarchy between the two parties, 
which can affect the relationship and the co-operation, although the background of 
the VTSO's erases that hierarchy to a certain degree. Another factor that is deemed to 
affect the co-operation and the relationship is the fact that pilots and VTSOs do not 
know each other in person since they have never meet. 
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 6 Discussion and analysis
6.1. The themes 
The themes that have been developed will hereunder be discussed and analysed. It 
should be noted that all the themes are interconnected in one way or the other and 
they all  affect  each other;  moreover,  each theme itself  is  an area that  calls  for a 
deeper  analysis  in  order  to  gain  thorough knowledge of  the  subject.  The  chosen 
approach here is to analyse and discuss the themes in an isolated way; this is due to 
reasons  of  simplicity and the  fact  that  a  deeper  analysis  is  not  that  aim for  this 
dissertation. In this section there is text that is in italic font, which indicates that it is 
a statement/comment that is derived directly from the interviews. 
 6.1.1 Current and future views on VTS and pilotage
When the pilots and the VTSOs were asked about the purpose of their jobs, they gave 
similar answers like e.g. Contribute to safety when a ship is sailing to or from a port  
or  in  a  fairway  and  that  the  overall  goal  is  to  avoid  accidents.  Further  on,  the 
answers showed that one of the main objectives with the service provided was to 
preserve  the  environment.  This  is  in  line  with  the  Resolutions  A960(23)  and 
A857(20);  moreover,  it  is  in  line  with  the  goals  set  for  the  services  by  SMA 
(“Sjöfartsverket - Maritime Traffic Information,” 2009; “Sjöfartsverket - Pilotage,” 
2009). However, it was also recognized by the respondents that in addition to the 
safety  perspective,  the  services  aim  at  improving  the  efficiency  of  ship  traffic, 
meaning that the ships should have a safe and fast passage with as few delays as 
possible. The two goals of safety and efficiency might propose implications on one 
and another. In the book Normal Accident Theory,  Perrow states, although in the 
context of Air Traffic Control, that organising traffic in the most efficient way might 
be in conflict with safety standards (Perrow, 1999, p. 158). This conflict of goals, is 
apparent in the maritime industry as well, and the areas of pilotage and VTS are no 
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exception. For example, the pilot can be subject to economical pressure from the 
ships owner, which could take the form of pressure from the agent acting on behalf 
of the owner requiring, that the ship should be berthed although the conditions might 
not be safe according to the pilot. The VTSO meets similar problems in the daily 
work, if the operator has the power to close a port due to e.g. bad visibility, this will 
have an economic impact on the ships and their owner. The conflict between safety 
and efficiency is well known; it was e.g. identified by the managers of E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours Powder Company in the beginning of the twentieth century. However, is 
there really a conflict? – To be safe is to be efficient - to have an accident will impact 
negative  on  the  efficiency.  This  was  also  the  result  of  the  above  mentioned 
experiments and the management shifted focus from efficiency towards promoting 
safety, which resulted in an overall better efficiency  (J. C. Wood & M. C. Wood, 
2002, p. 283). The balance between efficiency and safety is a constant struggle, a 
struggle that needs to be acknowledge by the management. 
The  only  real  difference  between  pilots  and  VTSOs  when  they  were  asked  to 
describe the purpose of their job was that the VTSOs considered themselfes more as 
a service organisation than the pilots did. This is underpinned by the answers given 
on the question where they were asked to describe the purpose with the opposite job 
(i.e. the pilots described the purpose of VTS and vice versa). It is clear that the pilots 
see VTS as a service to them and other ships, and this is also in line with the VTSO's 
views of their job.
New  and  existing  technology  has  a  great  impact  on  both  services,  which  was 
acknowledged by respondents from both groups. Technology is in the center of the 
operations in a VTS Centre of today, because almost all tasks are performed with the 
aid of technological equipment (Jean-Hansen, Sagberg, Hoff, & Brotnov, 2005) This 
makes the relationship between VTSOs and technology to be something natural. This 
were  mirrored  in  the  interviews,  as  it  was  clear  that  the  VTSO's  were  positive 
towards technology,  new technology will help us to offer a better service and  new 
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technology will make our job more easy are typical statements during the interviews 
with  the  VTSOs.  The  pilots  on  the  other  hand  are  generally  positive  towards 
technology, although in a more sceptic way. They are satisfied with the technical aids 
that they are using today, and they believe that they do increase the safety margin. 
However, pilots acknowledge that there are risks involved in the fast development of 
new and existing technological aids, and as one pilot stated  there is a risk with all  
technology that we are to use – one might lose focus on the core task. Moreover, the 
pilots did make a connection between technological development and the possibility 
of SBP to evolve from the drawing table into a service that will be used in practice. 
The issue of SBP is something that the pilots believe will not work in practice, and it 
is a clear threat to their livelihood. The pilots emphasises the need for better training 
of the crews onboard ships if they are to be able to take advantage of the technical 
aids and thereby be able to sail without a pilot on board or in a SBP system, or as one 
pilot put it: the work of a pilot will not change as long as the crew do not know how 
to utilize the technology onboard.  
Both groups of respondents believe that their profession will be around in the future; 
the overall judgement by the VTSOs regarding the future was that their future is in 
the hands of politicians, but with comments like:  VTS services will not go away in  
the future, VTS is a service that are growing all over the world and our existent are 
proved by history It is obvious that there is a strong belief in the future development 
of VTS Services. The pilots did give voice to a more mixed view of the future, as it 
was  recognized  that  protecting  the  environment  is  an  issue  that  is  high  on  the 
political agenda and it can advocate the need for pilots. The fact that the crews on the 
ships are poorly trained are another issue in favour for the pilot business. On the 
other  hand,  concerns  were  raised  about  how the  ongoing organisational  changes 
within the SMA would affect the pilots, and there was a concern that they might be 
privatized in a not to far away future. Moreover, several investigations have been 
made on how to make pilotage more efficient by means of using new technology and 
by reconstructing the forms and regulations for pilotage. The most extensive one was 
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ordered by the Swedish government with the purpose to:
review  certain  piloting  issues  (ToR  2006:  116).  The  remit  has  included 
showing how new technology can facilitate and streamline pilotage services 
and  examining  the  possibilities  of  developing  pilotage  from a  land-based 
centre (Bjelfvenstam, 2007, p. 25). 
This investigation was followed by others, such as:
• Task regarding new technology for pilotage (Uppdrag avseende ny teknik 
för lotsning) (Grundevik & Wilske, 2007)
• Decision Support for Navigation (Anderson, Koester, & Steenberg, 2007) 
• Report  pre-study “Piloting from Shore” (Lutzhöft,  Dahlman,  & Prison, 
2008)
The purpose of these investigations can be summarized as investigations into how to 
make pilotage more efficient by means of technology, and they all investigated the 
possibility of SBP. It is likely that SBP will be performed from a VTS centre, which 
most probably will create job opportunities for VTSOs, while it is not far fetched to 
make the assumption that these investigations affect the pilot's view of the future in a 
negative way.  
 6.1.2 Information
The need for  information  exchange between  pilots  and  VTSOs is  deemed to  be 
limited by both respondent groups; from the pilots there were comments like:  As a 
pilot nothing, we did good before VTS, considering today's technology – VTS is not  
necessary and if I need information then I ask for it.  This could be interpreted that 
pilots  are  satisfied  with  the  information  they  have  and  do  not  need  any further 
information. The VTSOs are having similar thoughts on the information exchange, 
no special information are needed just be case there is a pilot onboard and we will  
treat a ship with a pilot the same way as any other ship These are indications that the 
need for information is limited to the standard information needed from every ship 
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that enters the VTS area. The notion of information is widely used and the meaning 
of information is hard to pin down. According to Davenport and Prusak there is an 
old  distinction  between  data,  information  and  knowledge.  This  distinction  is 
criticised by them, because they are of the opinion that information is an umbrella 
term  for  all  three  and  serves  as  the  connection  between  data  and  knowledge. 
However, for the purpose of this dissertation, the proposed definitions made by them 
will  be used to illuminate the notion of information in this specific context.  It  is 
proposes that Data is simple observations of the world, and in the context of pilotage 
and VTS that  can  be  for  instance  the  water  level.  The  next  step is  Information, 
namely  data endowed with relevance and purpose, and finally there is Knowledge 
which incorporates interpretation and contextualisation by a human  (Davenport & 
Prusak, 1997). If putting this in the context of the information exchange between 
pilots  and  VTSOs  and  adding  comments  like:  we  have  the  same  source  of  
information  and we have all information our self, it  becomes clear that since the 
source of data is the same, the information transferred by the VTS is regarded as 
unnecessary,  and  it  can  even  be  irritating  to  receive  the  information,  since  it  is 
already known.  The  above  is  true  regarding  general  information;  however,  both 
groups  of  respondents  do  acknowledge  that  in  special  cases  there  is  a  need  for 
information exchange. Those cases are related to situations where either one of the 
groups, in one way or the other, are not able to obtain the data. Such situations could 
e.g. be when a pilot informs the VTS that the ship has restricted manoeuvrability due 
to loss of steering; the pilot in this case collects the data from his/her position on the 
ship and transfers it to the VTS, which in turn transforms it into information that is 
broadcast to the ships in the vicinity. Information exchange in the other direction i.e. 
from VTS to pilot could be for example if there are reported containers floating in 
the water. The VTS has the data and transfers it to the pilot, who will interpret it and 
use the information as ground for further decisions. There is further recognized a 
need for correct information, which was stressed by the pilots: the information has to  
be 100 % correct otherwise it is useless. It seems that the pilots are concerned if they 
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can  trust  the  information  from the  VTS,  and  base  their  decisions  on  it.  This  is 
supported by the SMA customer investigation presented in Chapter 2.4.1, where the 
area of information gets a low grade and is deemed to be a prioritized area to be able 
to improve the VTS service. This concern is fully appreciated when one thinks of the 
context in which the pilots are preforming; they are “out there” close to the action 
and close to the result of the used information.  Part of this concern might stem from 
the fact discussed earlier, that the source of the data is the same e.g. the water level is 
checked by the pilot and a short while later the VTS informs the pilot about the water 
level. However, there is a difference in the water level perceived by the pilot and the 
information gained from the VTS. This can be an issue of concern for the pilot and 
might affect the trustworthiness negatively, rendering in the pilot checking the water 
level again to be sure that he has the accurate data as a base on further decisions. 
The explanation of the difference in water level might be a sudden change in the 
water level or that the information is not yet updated on the computer screen in front 
of the VTSO. Another situation could be if the VTSO informs the pilot about a ship's 
intended route, the pilot receives the information and base the decisions on that. A 
few moments later that ship could alter course in an unpredicted way and cause a 
close quarter situation for the pilot. The pilot will question the information from the 
VTS, however; the VTSO acted on the information known to him without knowing 
that the turning ship just received a change of destination and thereby changed the 
course,  without  informing  the  VTS  (these  two  examples  are  taken  from  real 
situations).  If  a  pilot  is  exposed  to  this  kind  of  situations  repetitively  without 
knowing all the factors behind the information, it is understandable that it will create 
a scepticism towards the validity of the information received from VTS.
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 6.1.3 Communication 
Information and communication  are  notions  that  are  intertwined with  each other. 
Communication  is  to;  talk  to  each  other,  television,  the  clothes  we are  wearing, 
newspaper and many other activities (Fiske, 1984, p. 11); moreover, communication 
is a necessity within all social interactions  (Giddens, 1998, p. 638). The content of 
the  communication  process  is  usually  denoted  as  information.  The  notion  of 
communication is  “to talk to” in a process that  is  mutual;  however,  it  should be 
acknowledged that there is a communication form that is one-way, namely the one-
way communication  process  (Palm,  1989,  p.  13).  The  communication  process  is 
described in  several  ways;  however,  most  of  the proposed descriptions  contain a 
sender, a receiver, channel (medium) and message. In Shannon and Weaver's book 
Mathematical Theory of Communication there is one part added called noise source. 
The noise source is everything that is added to the signal that is not intended by the 
source, which could be technical issues such as noise from a bad connection (Fiske, 
1984, p. 18). According to Kaufmann and Kaufmann the source of noise can consist 
of  filtering  the  information,  selective precipitation,  feelings,  language,  amount  of 
information, non-verbal signals and time pressure. All these are barriers that stands 
between  the  message  as  it  is  perceived  by  the  sender  to  how  the  message  is 
understood by the receiver (G. Kaufmann & A. Kaufmann, 2005, p. 372). Hereunder, 
the barriers to communication offered by Kaufmann and Kaufmann will be used in 
the context of communication between pilots and VTSOs.
Short, concise and friendly – strait, positive – short, precise and professional are all 
comments  on how the  respondents  perceive the communication between the  two 
groups. It is further perceived as positive, that the communication is following the 
SMCP and that it is in English. The fact that all communication is done in English is 
a way of overcoming the  language barrier identified by Kaufmann & Kaufmann; 
moreover, it allows all the ships in the area to be able to understand the conversation. 
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We  talk  the  same  language  is  a  comment  that  reoccurs  within  both  respondent 
groups; by language it is meant “sea speech”, a way of communicating that is derived 
from education and the following experience of a sailor. This phenomena helps the 
communication  in  a  positive  way.  Although  the  communication  is  deemed  to  be 
generally good, most of the comments were regarding the technical communications 
i.e. how the communication is performed when it  occurs.  However, when talking 
about communication in a broader sense, the picture is not quite the same. There is a 
reluctancy to communicate by the pilots, and part of this reluctancy is believed to be 
connected  with  the  limited  information  needed,  as  discussed  in  the  previous 
paragraph. The communication with a VTS can according to the pilots result in a 
feeling of irritation and could be disturbing in certain situations; moreover, simple 
things as the mode of the day can affect communication; one of the pilots stated that: 
sometimes I am short on the VHF, this is when I have a bad day and are fed up with 
the reporting procedures, this is a fault by me. This does indicate both that feelings, 
or in this case the daily spirit of the pilot and the pilots view of the VTS functions, do 
affect communication. Further, it can be seen as the pilots think that there is an over-
communication i.e. the amount of information that is communicated is deemed to 
be excessive. The solution for these issues, proposed by the pilots, is to have a silent 
VTS system. Time pressure i.e. stress is a factor that is named by both of the groups 
as negative with regards to communication.
 6.1.4 The relationship and co-operation
The relationship and co-operation are the result of previous discussed themes. Any 
glitches in either one of them will be visible within the context of co-operation and 
relationship, e.g. it is easy to see that if the communication does not work the co-
operation will suffer and in the end the relationship will suffer as well. 
During the interviews the notion of relationship and co-operation was perceived as 
being very close to each other in meaning, as many of the answers given on the 
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question addressing relationship was answered from a co-operation perspective.  This 
has resulted in some difficulties in separating them during the analysis. However, the 
fact  that  the  respondents  did  not  make  any  bigger  differences  between  the 
relationship and the co-operation, can be seen as evidence of how closely connected 
the two are. One issue that was raised by both of the groups were the fact that they 
seldom meet  face  to  face,  this  were  perceived  as  an  issue  that  affected  the  co-
operation and relationship in a negative way. The fact that the two groups do not 
meet face to face indicates that the interaction between them can be denoted as co-
operation over distance. That distance plays an important role in co-operation is a 
well known issue. In a survey done by Bradner and Gloria it was concluded that:
the data strongly indicate that the geographic distance between collaborating 
and previously unacquainted partners matters. The ability to persuade another 
and  the  willingness  to  initially  cooperate  decrease  with  distance  while 
deception of another person increases with distance (Bradner & Gloria, 2002, 
p. 9). 
Further,  Bradner  and  Gloria  emphasised  the  importance  of  trust,  because  it  is 
believed  that  if  there  is  a  sense  of  trust  between  the  co-operative  partners,  the 
negative effects offered by distance can be defeated. The issue of trust is something 
that is an essential factor in the co-operation between pilots and VTSOs, as touched 
up on in the previous Chapter 6.1.2 dealing with information, a mistrust between the 
two groups can be identified; however, that mistrust seems to be one way, since it is 
the  pilots  that  mistrust  the  VTSOs.  In  fact,  the  VTSOs  do  rank  pilots  as  very 
trustworthy, and this is underlined by comments like: the information revived from a 
pilot is very trustworthy.  The important role of trust is identified in the Report pre-
study “Piloting from Shore”.  This report  is  focusing on SBP; however,  there  are 
many similarities to be drawn with the co-operation between pilots and VTS. The 
conclusion of the report suggests that the area of focus for further work should be the 
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area  of  communications  and  trust.  Moreover,  it  is  stated  that  trust  is  intimately 
connected with face to face contact. Another finding made during the research for the 
report was that the pilots had observed that there was a lack of trust between the 
ship's crew and VTSOs (Lutzhöft et al., 2008). 
There are, amongst the VTSOs, an issue that seems to overweight all other issues; 
that issue is concerning the lack of communication with pilots. During the interviews 
there was numerous comments made about the reluctancy of certain pilots to answer 
the VTS when they were called on the VHF; pilots that do not answer the VHF when 
we call them - some pilots do not even answer on channel 16 - there are pilots that  
don't answer the VHF, this is very arrogant towards us and no answer from ships  
with pilot onboard, that is a strange feeling. These statements are underpinned by 
incident reports made by VTSOs, and there can be found several reports that deal 
with the non-compliance of pilots. As an example there was a ship with a draft of 8,8 
meters entering the area, with a pilot onboard. Since the draft of 8,8 meters is far too 
deep to transit through the Sound, the VTSO tried to radio the ship on both channel 
16 and channel 71 several  times without any success.  The VTSO then contacted 
Lyngby Radio and asked them if they could send a Digital Selective Call (DSC) to 
the  ship,  and  in  that  way establish  contact.  Lyngby Radio  was  able  to  establish 
contact, and the pilot informed that the present draft was 7,5 meters, which allows 
safe passage through the Sound. The pilot stated that the VTS system is a voluntary 
system and that he did not want to contact the VTS; moreover, the pilot did not see 
any problem with the AIS that indicated 8.8 meters (Sound VTS, 2009). 
This incident indicates that there is a clear reluctancy from the pilot to participate in 
the Sound VTS system; further, it also identifies a lack of understanding of how the 
VTS works, because it does so by the fact that he did not see any problem with 
having  an  AIS  transmitting  wrong  information.  The  issue  of  pilots  that  will  not 
participate in the VTS system was demonstrated by not answering when they are 
called, seems to be confined to the Danish pilots according to statements made by 
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VTSOs and the analysis of incident reports from Sound VTS (it should be noted that 
this is an extreme case, and that the majority of the Danish pilots do co-operate in the 
best way possible). There might be a parallel to be drawn with regards to the issue of 
co-operation over distance. The Swedish pilots are much closer to the VTSOs since 
they are stationed in the same building as the VTS, although on another floor, and 
this makes it easier for the Swedish pilots to meet the VTSOs in person. Another 
issue that might help to explain why there seems to be a more infected relationship 
with the Danish pilots could derive from the start up of Sound VTS. For the on the 
job training (OJT) the VTSOs are acquired to follow a pilot during a transit pilotage 
e.g. a piloted ship that transits the Sound from north to south. The Danish pilots did 
not  want  any VTSOs onboard while  they were  piloting;  however,  there  were  no 
problems in joining a Swedish pilot on a ship. The reason for this could be many and 
it does probably not reflect the opinion of all the Danish pilots; nevertheless it was 
perceived as negative by the VTSOs. 
Another area that was put forward during the interviews as a contributing factor to 
the relationship and the co-operation was the fact that there could be an element of 
competition between the two groups. Comments, such as I have always been positive  
towards VTS when I was sailing, but then there were no competition for work - the 
competition for work might be a factor that affects the communication - there is a  
struggle for power - SMA needs to inform what is going on to reduce the feeling of  
competition.  Further, the issue of competition is recognized by experts within the 
maritime  industry,  for  example  the  statements  made  by  IMO's  both  Secretary 
General's as presented in Chapter 2. Part of this issue can derive from the fact that 
the two parties identify them selves as belonging to two separate groups. A group can 
be anything from a few people like for example a family,  to vast groups that are 
determined by religion. This makes the definition of a group complicated and several 
authors  have  come  up  with  different  definitions  (Brown,  1988a). According  to 
Kaufmann and Kaufmann, a social group can be seen as a number of individuals with 
common interests of a more permanent sort e.g. common ideals, religion or interests 
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and that group members will affect each other by their actions (G. Kaufmann & A. 
Kaufmann, 2005).  However,  the pilots  and the VTSOs could be regarded as one 
group since they have a common interest in safety and they do affect each other. 
However, in several definitions of groups there is a criterion that interaction is made 
face to face (Johnsson & Johnsson as cited in (Hwang, 2005, p. 306). Following this 
it is not far fetched to make the assumption that pilots and VTSOs despite the fact 
that  they have many similarities,  can be viewed as two groups. It was also quite 
obvious  during the  interviews that  pilots  and VTSOS did  see themselves  as  two 
separate groups. Brown puts forward that the mere fact of belonging to two different 
groups will affect the view of the other group. Brown goes on and highlights two 
social psychological processes that can explain the intergroup problem. These two 
are  social  categorization  and  social  identification.  Social  categorization  can  be 
described  as  how  people  order  their  social  environment.  By dividing  the  social 
environment into categories, it will help individuals to define who they are i.e. social 
identification.  These two processes can explain that individuals get some of their 
self-worth from belonging to a certain group, and the better that group is, compared 
to  other  groups,  the  higher  self-worth  the  individual  will  feel.  All  this  together 
contributes  to  a  competition  between  groups  (Brown,  1988b).  The  competition 
between  groups  will  quite  naturally  have  an  impact  on  co-operation  and  the 
relationship.
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 7 Conclusion and recommendations
Pilot  services  and VTS services  are  two very similar  services;  they both  aim at 
increasing safety by providing information and assistance to ships. In the case of 
Sound VTS and Sound Pilotage the persons that render that service are also similar 
with regards  to  e.g.  professional  background,  education and training.  The overall 
impression is that the interaction between pilots and VTSOs are regarded as being 
limited  but  satisfactory  by  most  of  the  interviewed  respondents.  Although  the 
interaction between the two groups work without problems most of the time, issues 
such as a strong feeling of group belonging, lack of trust and lack of communication 
have been identified. These issues clearly have a negative impact on the interaction 
and do affect the services in a negative way. In the quest for gaining knowledge of 
how to improve the services, the negative issues found have been the main focal 
point  of  this  work,  and  therefore  it  has  painted  a  rather  black  picture  of  the 
interaction  between  pilots  and  VTSOs.  However,  it  should  be  stressed  that  the 
interaction is well functioning in most cases and do thereby contribute to a safer sea.
The  analysis  indicates  that  many  of  the  issues  found  are  derived  from  poor 
interpersonal  relations  and  a  strong  group  feeling.  Further,  the  fast  developing 
technology is an issue that affects the need for interaction. The pilots stated that the 
information obtained by the VTS was already known to them, and therefore it is felt 
unnecessary to receive it once more, and it can even be a source of disturbance while 
performing their tasks. According to the author, VTS has to take this into account 
when  developing  working  procedures.  The  fact  that  pilots  most  often  have  the 
information that they need could also serve as part of the explanation of the result 
derived from the customer investigation ordered by SMA. The ship's officers do not 
have access to the same information sources as the pilots do and do therefore find the 
information from the VTS useful. The incitements for co-operation between the two 
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services were deemed to be limited under normal circumstances by the interviewed 
respondents; however, both groups do acknowledge that there are situations where 
they both could gain on enhanced co-operation. However, it is believed that to be 
able to do that in an effective way the hinder proposed by the social issues has to be 
addressed. The competitive group feeling has to be abolished and replaced with a 
feeling of being a team that works towards the same goal. To be able to facilitate 
such co-operation the individuals have to have a genuine trust in each other. The 
issue of trust is a central issue because if there is no trust the interaction will not have 
any  solid  ground  to  grow  in.  As  described  by  Lutzhöft  et  al.,  trust  is  closely 
connected  with  face  to  face  contact,  to  meet  each  other  in  person.  This  is  also 
brought forward by the VTSOs and the pilots as they think that if they were to meet 
in person it would be easier to co-operate. One way to achieve this could be to train 
pilots and VTSOs together, since this will provide a better understanding of how the 
other service functions and it will also be an excellent chance to get to know each 
other and thereby building up the trust.  Moreover,  this combined training will be 
time and cost saving. If there is success in building up the trust and thereby achieving 
a team feeling, it might open the road to involve the VTS more actively in Bridge 
Resource Management (BRM) onboard ships. If the VTS are acting as a member of 
the BRM team then the two systems will complement each other in an effective way, 
and thereby the level of safety will rise considerably. 
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